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The narrative of conquest is an integrated part of the Tennessee River 's 
history. It is far from the only na1Tative connected with the Tennessee, but 
it is one of the most potent. From John Donelson 's journey down the river 
in 1779 to the environmental conquest of the river by Roosevelt's Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA), the waterway has continually been 
inscribed in a complex tale of attempted human domination at times 
exerted over other peoples and cultures by way of the river, at times over 
the river itself. 
The naITative of conquest was inscribed upon the banks of the Ten-
nessee long before white settlement transformed the area. The Cherokee, 
Creek, and Chickasaw tribes used the river for matters as diverse as mar-
riage and war, and navigating its deadly currents often proved a battle in 
itself. Yet as the influx of white settlers into the Tennessee Valley 
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increased in the late 18th century the story of conquest became the 
increasingly dominant narrative. By looking at three different versions of 
this narrative (the Donelson journey, the relocation of the Cherokees, and 
the battle of Shiloh) this essay will outline some of the narrative heritage 
that has become such a central part of the river 's history. 
The Donelson Expedition 
The Indian peoples of the Tennessee Valley were left largely undisturbed 
by their European neighbors until the end of the 18th century. Up until 
then the French had monopolized a great deal of the trade and navigation 
on the Mississippi River but although they were interested in the Indian 
trade of the Tennessee Valley, the natural obstacles presented by Muscle 
Shoals, a formidable sixty mile stretch of rapids, largely hindered their 
passage up the Tennessee River. In the same way the Appalachian Moun-
tains of eastern Tennessee served as a natural barrier to the western 
expansion of the English colonies in Virginia and North Carolina, and by 
the 1760s there were still only few travelers in the region. 
By the 1770s, however, rumors of the Tennessee Valley's fertile allu-
vial lands spread rapidly among the settlers of Virginia and North Car-
olina, and a steady stream of traders and scouts began entering the valley 
by rivers and overland routes. The interest in purchasing the cheap and 
fertile lands along the Tennessee and the Cumberland rivers was great, 
and officials from North Carolina, as well as representatives from private 
companies such as the newly founded Transylvania Company, constantly 
looked to extend the boundaries of their settlements. 
Naturally the many trespasses on to their teITitory proved greatly dis-
tressing to the Cherokees, and at the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals in 1775 
a fraction of warriors broke away from the Cherokee Nation. The 
Chickamaugas, as they called themselves, declared war on all settlers in 
the area, and as the group left the Sycamore Shoals meeting, their 
young, muscular, and pockmarked leader, Dragging Canoe, warned the 
representatives of the Transylvania Company that although they had 
"bought a fair land" they would "find its settlement dark and bloody" 
(Govan 27) . 
The Chickamaugas kept their promise and by early 1779 the govern-
ments of Virginia and North Carolina were drained economically and 
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psychologically by the many attacks on American settlements in the Ten-
nessee and Cumberland valleys (as well as by the ongoing revolutionary 
war against Britain). Finally, officials from the two states decided to 
launch a large-scale counter offensive. A party of five hundred men , a 
combination of the revolutionary armies of Colonel Evan Shelby and 
Colonel John Montgomery, met at the mouth of Big Creek on the Hol-
ston. Ironically, the strike upon the Chickamaugas relied upon the sol-
diers ' ability to imitate Indian woodcrafts. They spent ten days making 
Indian style canoes and pirogues from the trees of the surrounding forest 
in an effort to speedily navigate the river and maintain the element of sur-
prise in the attack; and the plan worked. Taking advantage of the swift · 
current created by the spring tide , so "rapid was the descent of this first 
naval armament down the ri ver, as to take the enemy completely by sur-
prise" (Ramsey 187). In fact, the raid was such a surprise that although 
the number of warriors present in the town of Chickamauga was equal to 
the number of soldiers and could easily have put up a fight, at the sight of 
the soldiers everyone in town simply turned and fled into the mountains. 
Shelby and Montgomery destroyed no less than eleven towns during the 
raid, but the Chickamaugas merely escaped farther down river, set up 
new towns and continued their raids against white settlements. 
In spite of the Chickamaugas' attacks the settlement of the Tennessee 
Valley continued. Permanent settlements were already being planned on 
the banks of the Cumberland River (the area that had been opened up to 
settlement by the Treaty at Sycamore Shoals) , and in December of 1779 
Colonel John Donelson embarked on a four month journey that would 
eventually take him down the Tennessee, up the Ohio to the mouth of the 
Cumberland River, and up the Cumberland to the new settlements at the 
site of Nash borough (present-day Nashville). There he was to rendezvous 
with James Robertson , who earlier that same year had led the most expe-
rienced hunters and Indian fighters of the expedition to the settlement by 
an overland route known as the Kentucky Trace. Donelson 's fleet of flat-
boats would then bring the less experienced and older men, as well as the 
women and children , and as many household goods as possible. 
Although Donelson's trip was perceived to be the safer of the two 
routes, his task was by no means easy or desirable . The winter of 1779 
"was one of the coldest ever known in the Tennessee country .... a season 
when the hardiest pioneer might have wished himself a bear, to curl 
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inside a hollow tree and suck his paw" (Davidson 1991, 149). Indeed , in 
light of the weather, the dangerous waters the party was to travel , and the 
context of Tennessee's troublesome and bloody settlement, Donelson 's 
voyage became one of multiple conquests , settling a heathen Indian Ter-
ritory in the name of America as well as Christianity, while claiming a 
human triumph over nature. 
The party embarked on the journey on December 22 and entered the 
Tennessee proper on March 4. Already in Indian Territory the party was 
forced to post guards in the event of an attack. Three days later, on March 
7 , the wind and rain forced the fleet to make camp at the site of one the 
former Chickamauga towns which had been deserted during the cam-
paign of Shelby and Montgomery less than a year before. To the party the 
encounter with the Chickamauga ghost-town must have served as a 
reminder of the military campaign itself, but it also suggested how much 
of the river that was already under American control. 
After leaving the deserted town the party soon came upon the new 
Chickamauga towns , and in his journal Donelson notes how on several 
occasions the party was attacked by the hostile Indians . In spite of con-
tinued attempts to lure the expedition into town by friendly words and 
presents , the Donelson-party wisely kept to the opposite shore away from 
the villages. Still, several members of the expedition were killed in these 
attacks, including 28 passengers of one flatboat that had purposefully 
been trailing the rest of the fleet due to an epidemic of smallpox. Hearing 
the screams and the sound of gunfire as the Indians fell upon this last 
boat, the expedition could only continue moving down the river. The 
swiftness of the stream that had carried the patty past the Chickamauga 
towns too fast for the Indians to launch any real coordinated assault, also 
prevented any turning back to help the doomed boat. As Davidson grimly 
comments, the expedition 's only solace must have been the certainty 
"that the smallpox would wreak revenge for them; and tradition says that 
it did" (Davidson 1991 , 160). 
On March 12, the company finally reached Muscle Shoals. The party 
was anxious to avoid crossing the dangerous shoals, and as it turns out 
Donelson had made a deal with James Robertson , that he was to have left 
a sign if it was in any way possible for the fleet to proceed over land 
rather than attempt to cross the shoals. But to Donelson's distress no such 
sign was to be found, and because the party believed that they were still 
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in danger from the Chickamaugas, it was decided that the safer route was 
down the river and over the shoals which 
had a dreadful appearance lo those who had never seen them before. The water being 
high made a terri ble roaring , which could be heard at some distance among the drift-
wood heaped frightfully upon the points of the islands , the current running in every 
possible direction. Here we did not know how soon we should be dashed to pieces, and 
al l our troubles ended at once. Our boats frequently dragged on the bottom, and appe-
ared constantly in danger of striking. They warped as much as in a rough sea. 
(Donelson 200) 
Donelson 's view of the shoals would soon change however. The spring 
tide carried the party across the approximately sixty miles of shoals in . 
only three short hours. Had the water been at a lower stage their passage 
of Muscle Shoals would have been nearly impossible, and undoubtedly 
had a more tragic outcome, but from Donelson 's perspective they had 
conquered yet another part of the Tennessee, and his description of the 
dangerous rapids suddenly changed as he pondered the length of " this 
wondetful shoal" (Donelson 20 l). Clearly Donelson 's success in passing 
the most dangerous and difficult obstacle on the river allowed him , as 
narrator, to reduce Muscle Shoals to a mere part of the scenic river land-
scape. Rhetorically and psychologically, his journal reflects a transforma-
tion from inferiority to superiority that casts his feat in terms of a con-
quest. To Donelson the party tamed the river as the journey progressed. 
· Only three days later the party reached the Ohio River. The situation 
must have looked depressing to the exhausted party as high waters and a 
swift current made an ascend to the mouth of the Cumberland almost 
impossible. Tired and starved, the party labored against the current of the 
Ohio for nine days before reaching the mouth of the Cumberland, a mere 
twelve miles above the Tennessee. Once on the Cumberland, however, 
the current slowed down and the rest of the trip proved relatively easy. 
On Apri l 23 they arrived at the first settlements and the very next day 
reached their destination at the Big Salt Lick. 
Donelson's journal is a nmTative of conquest on several levels. Aside 
from the political and historical context of Tennessee's settlement, the 
taming of the wilderness , and Donelson's personal discourse of conquest 
and bravery, the journal also describes a victory of Christianity over a 
heathen landscape and its peoples. As the title of the journal suggests, the 
voyage served a divine purpose by settling a heathen country in God's 
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name, but Donelson also evokes God's protection during the journey. For 
example , he makes it clear that the party was able to pass Muscle Shoals 
only "by the hand of Providence" (Donelson 201). Thus, the voyage 
becomes inscribed in the larger religious and cultural narrative of civi-
lizing and converting the wilderness. In Donelson's narrative, God 
claims control over Muscle Shoals in order to allow his pilgrims to pass 
safely, overruling an Indian landscape complete with its own history, 
mythology , and deities. Through Donelson's voyage, Christianity seem-
ingly conquers the Indian river banishing its wilderness qualities and 
transforming it into part of civilized and Christianized America. 
The River of Relocation 
By the early 19th century the native cultures of the Tennessee Valley had 
largely succumbed to the pressure of white migration. But even though 
the territory held by the Indians was rapidly diminishing, the Governors 
of Georgia and Tennessee continued to pressure the federal government 
to initiate a program of relocation which the states had been promised in 
1802. Although most Cherokees had been quick to adopt a strategy of 
assimilation in an effort to establish themselves as equals within Amer-
ican society, they balanced on the brink of being forced out of their 
homelands; and just as the settlement of the Tennessee Valley, the coming 
removal of the Indians followed the winding waters of the Tennessee 
River system. 
Prior to 1820, individual Cherokee families had begun to move in 
order to find refuge and isolation from the expanding American society, 
and boats full of Indian emigrants became a more common sight during 
the 1820s. The emigrants often travelled via the rivers going down first 
the Tennessee and the Ohio, and finall y the Mississippi River to get to 
present-day Arkansas. In 1829, for example, seventy keel- and flatboats 
were delivered to the Cherokees' agent, and over the course of the next 
two years all of these boats left for the trans-Mississippi West. Most of 
the emigrants left from Gunter's Landing from where they descended the 
Tennessee, the Ohio , and the Mississippi to the mouth of White River. 
From there a steamboat transported the Cherokees up the Arkansas River 
to their new home in Oklahoma. 
Yet there seemed to be a pattern to these voluntary relocations . 
THE RIVER OF CONQUEST 155 
According to Grant Foreman, an observer noted that on one boat, out of 
nearly 200 passengers only "few of them looked like Indians as most of 
them were intermarried whites with their Indian families and negro 
slaves" (Foreman 231) . The picture was the same in 1832 as a party of 
380 Cherokees were getting ready to leave. Out of the emigrants, 108 
were black, forty were white, and the remaining majority was of mixed 
blood. Indeed, only very few full -blooded Indians seem to have signed up 
for the removal at all . 
In an attempt to enrol as many Cherokee families as possible for relo-
cation, the federal government formed commissions who were to per-
suade, assis t and direct the emigrants. However, enrolment often had to . 
be realized by offering the poor Indians annuities for signing up , and 
filling the boats was still slow work because many tribal leaders threat-
ened anyone who signed up with physical punishment. Consequently, 
although poverty and rough winters guaranteed the enrolment of many 
suffering and poor Cherokees, when it became time to relocate, few came 
to the Cherokee Agency in Calhoun, Tennessee. Most of those who 
signed up had done so merely to receive the economic benefits that were 
included in the deal. The few emigrants that did arrive at the Cherokee 
Agency were housed in primitive huts along the Hiwassee River. There 
they could find some shelter from the weather, but conditions were crude 
and did not improve once the journey started. The relatively open flat-
boats did not afford much shelter from the cold wind and rain, and in 
some cases the boats had not even been outfitted with a firepl ace or an 
oven. As a result many of the emigrants fell ill , some die<l , an<l yet others 
deserted during the trip, and as stories of the miserable conditions spread 
to those remaining behind, it became increasingly difficult to get anyone 
to sign up. 
The hardships of one journey are recorded in the journal of physician 
Dr. C. Lillybridge from New York, who attended a party of Cherokee 
emigrants on their journey down the Tennessee in March of 1837. The 
journal of this trip gives an excellent example of what these relocations 
were like, and Lillybridge's account seems remarkable only in the sense 
that not a single passenger died on the trip. Central in the narrative are the 
diseases that tormented the emigrants, the many locals who attempted to 
peddle their whisky to the Indians, and the general disrespect with which 
those who had planned the relocation treated the Cherokees. 
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Lillybridge's party embarked from Ross ' Landing on March 3, trav-
eling a mere five miles on the first clay. Already at this early point, how-
ever, Lillybridge commented on the poor shelter which the boats pro-
vided the emigrants. "Night cold with high winds. Boats too open for the 
comfort of the emigrants" (Foreman "Journey," 234). In the cold and 
damp March weather many of the immigrants soon became ill with the 
common cold , fever, and diaiThea. The lack of shelter on the boats indi-
cated the lack of concern with which the relocation had been planned, 
and in one instance, having aITived in Decatur from where the emigrants 
were to be transported across Muscle Shoals by train, an entire day was 
spent "setting upon the open Carrs, waiting the arrival of the locomotive, 
the weather having become very cold" (Foreman "Journey," 236). When 
the order was finally given that the train would not leave until the next 
morning , Lillybridge "was not a little surprised to find that no one had 
made it his business to aid and direct the Indians , where they could lie for 
the night" (Foreman "Journey," 236). 
When the party reached Tuscumbia on the other side of the shoals , the 
second part of the river journey began and once again Lillybridge found 
the boats to be below standard. Travelling upon the steamboat Newark, as 
well as in a number of keelboats in tow, the boats were "entirely too lim-
ited in room and conveniences for the accorrnnodation of the party. The 
Keel Boats are without stoves or fires in them ... & present to those 
accustomed ... to many of the comforts of civilized life , rather a revolting 
spectacle" (Foreman "Journey," 239) . Reaching Oklahoma on March 28 
most were glad to be off the boats, although the new landscapes of that 
area must have seemed both strange and frightening to many of the emi-
grants. 
Although little thought had been given to the welfare of the families 
who signed up for voluntary relocation , nothing compared to the forced 
removal of the Cherokees that took place in the summer of 1838. By 
early 1838 on ly 2,000 Cherokees had relocated , leaving nearly 17 ,000 
Indians who were still living in the East. Frustrated with the pace of vol-
untary relocation the government warned the Cherokees, reminding them 
that according to the Treaty at New Echota they had ceded all their 
remaining lands and were to be ready for relocation on May 23 at the 
latest. The treaty had been signed by a small and unrepresentative group 
of pro-relocation Cherokees who called themselves the Treaty Party. 
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They had secretly met with representatives of the United States in 1835 
reaching an agreement whereby all Cherokee lands were sold for 5 mil-
lion dollars and some land rights in Oklahoma. In spite of the fact that an 
overwhelming majority of the Cherokee Nation claimed no knowledge of 
the treaty and protested that the Treaty Party had no mandate to negotiate 
on their behalf, the treaty proved the solution for everything many Amer-
icans had hoped for and was quickly ratified by the Senate . 
In May 1838 armed soldiers began rounding up Cherokee individuals 
and fa milies at gunpoint, leading them to departure camps. Families "at 
dinner were startled by the sudden gleam of bayonets in the doorway and 
rose to be driven with blows and oaths along the weary miles of trail that · 
led to the stockades .... in many cases, on turning for one last look ... they 
saw their homes in flames, fired by the lawless rabble that fo llowed on 
the heels of the soldiers to loot and pillage" (Mooney 130). As families 
were rushed to the nearest camps, they often became separated in the pro-
cess and were shipped off individually, not knowing whether they would 
ever see their parents, children, or spouses again. 
When nearly all 17 ,000 Cherokees had been gathered in the stockades, 
they were divided up into smaller groups in which they were to travel. In 
early June three such parties of around 2,800 individuals were shipped 
down the ri ver. The first party, consisting of approximately 800 people, 
left on June 6 under the supervision of Lieutenant Edward Deas. On June 
15 the next party followed carrying 875 emigrants. Deas was an experi-
enced officer in dealing with emigrants, and he had traveled the Ten-
nessee before. In 1835 he had supervised the emigration of a party of 
Creek Indians from Georgia and Alabama to west of the Mississippi. But 
although experienced in matters of Indian removal, Deas nevertheless 
made a mistake when, due to the confusion on the overcrowded boat 
decks, he did not count the Cherokee emigrants until they reached Tus-
cumbia. At this point he had only 489 left , the rest had either died from 
disease or by accident, or simply deserted in order to return home. 
According to Satz, the "mortality rate of the first 3,000 captive Indians 
who departed under military supervision was horribly high due to dis-
ease, exposure, fatigue, and other hardships of travel" (Satz 93). Seeing 
these tragedies of the forced relocation, the Cherokee leaders pleaded 
with the government to allow them to conduct their own removal. The 
wish was granted by President Van Buren and by October 1838 the 
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remaining thousands of Cherokees moved westward by an overland route 
on what has been remembered as the Trail of Tears. Almost one third of 
the 17 ,000 Cherokees had died as a result of the hardships of travel or the 
lacking treatment in the camps. The conquest of the Cherokee lands was 
over and only the few that had managed to escape during the relocation 
remained in the area they considered their home. 
Shiloh and the Defeat of a Southern River 
As the Civil War began in 1861, the Tennessee undoubtedly was far from 
most people's minds. Yet, winding its way into the very heart of the Con-
federacy , the Tennessee soon became one of the war's most contested ter-
rains. A native born Kentuckian, and an old fl atboat man himself, Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln was acutely aware of the importance of control-
ling the Cumberland and the Tennessee ii vers when he supposedly stated 
that while hoping " to have God on his side, he must have Kentucky" 
(McPherson 284). 
The Confederates were also aware of the dangerous scenario that the 
Tennessee might be turned into "a Union highway into the Deep South" 
(McPherson 397) . Yet the defense of the river was weak, and in just one 
month (during February of 1862) the Union forces took control of both 
the lower Tennessee and the Cumberland River. With the loss of the 
Cumberland River Nashville was suddenly open to attack , and via the 
Tennessee the Union forces could move in on the city of Columbus on 
the M ississippi River from behind, or attack the town of Corinth, Ten-
nessee, one of the main railroad centers of the South. 
By March General Halleck decided to make an attempt at gaining con-
trol over Corinth and cut the lines of the southern rai lroad. He ordered 
Grant to Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River with his 40 ,000 men, 
where General Buell shortly after was to join him with an additional 
35,000 troops. In total , Grant had six divisions under his command. Two 
of these divisions had been placed ahead in the unlikely event of an 
attack, and one di vision under the command of General Lew Wallace had 
been stationed some miles north of the other camps to guard the depots. 
Confident that no attack would come until he himself initiated it, Grant 
himself had set up camp at Pittsburg Landing with the three remaining 
divisions. However, a Confederate joint force consisting of the armies of 
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General Albert Sidney Johnston and the flamboyant General Beauregard 
waited at Corinth, and having foreseen Halleck's move they planned to 
strike Grant before Buell had time to reach Pittsburg Landing. 
The Confederate attack was planned for April 4 and called for a long 
march to the battleground. But heavy rains and the great number of inex-
perienced soldiers caused almost two days of delay, as troops got lost in 
the woods and wagons got stuck on the muddy roads . Furthermore, Beau-
regard was certain that any moment of surprise had been ruined by sol-
diers firing their rifles into the air in order to check their wet ammunition. 
But Grant 's overconfidence and the fact that northern troops also tested 
their ammunition by firing into the air meant that when thousands of 
screaming rebels burst out of the woods on the morning of April 6 , the 
Union troops were not ready for them. 
Grant who heard the attack as he was eating breakfast at Savannah, a 
couple of miles down dver from Pittsburg Landing , promptly steamed up 
to the battleground, but by then there was little he could do to turn the 
battle around. After ten hours of fighting, a total of 2,000 soldiers had 
died , including the Confederate General Johnston who "was struck in the 
thigh by a Minie ball , and, not having a surgeon in attendance , bled to 
death on the field" (Davidson 1992). Recognizing that his troops had no 
more to give , Beauregard called off a final attack and camped for the 
night. There was no question that the Confederacy had won the day, 
taking many of the positions formerly held by the Union army, and as the 
northern troops were driven back many saw the muddy waters of the Ten-
nessee as their onl y rescue. However, by nightfall Buell had arrived with 
fresh troops that were being ferried over the Tennessee, and the dark gave 
the Union soldiers a chance to reorganize. 
The second day began with another surprise attack, but this time it was 
Grant who had ordered it, and the momentum gave the Union troops the 
advantage. Furthermore, the reinforcements brought by Buell meant that 
Grant had more men and fresh troops, and in general the northern army 
was better supplied than its southern counterpart. By that afternoon the 
Confederate army had been driven back to the point of the original attack , 
and the death toll was staggering. Both armies were exhausted from the 
many hours of fighting, and ultimately Beauregard gave the order to 
retreat in order to save what was left of his army. No real advances had 
been made during the fighting, as the Union troops had merely recon-
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quered what they had lost on the first day. But the magnitude of the battle 
with 20 ,000 casualties, as well as the size of the Unjon fleet unparalleled 
in American history, testifies to the strategic importance of the Ten-
nessee. No less than fourteen gunboats, 153 transport boats , and twenty 
steamboats took part in the battle of Shiloh , and it would not be the last 
battle for control of the Tennessee Valley; ahead lay such bloody con-
frontations as the battle of Chickamauga and the long fight over Chat-
tanooga. 
The conquest of the Tennessee River was essential to winning the war, 
but the conquest of the river also became a symbolic conversion of a 
southern landscape in Ambrose Bierce's short story "What I saw of 
Shiloh." Told from a northern point of view, the story subtly uses the con-
quest of the Tennessee River as a subplot and background to the main 
naintive. In Bierce's story, the river, running under "sylvan arches 
heavily draped with Spanish moss" (Bierce 3), is part of a uniquely 
southern landscape and as such it is hurt by the intrusion of the Union 
gunboats. As Bierce writes , "when they let off their big guns there was a 
conflagration. The river shuddered in its banks, and hurried on , bloody, 
wounded, terrified!" (Bierce 5). The inferred violence of the gunboats 
hurts the river as an embodiment of the South, and by taming the river the 
South is ultimately defeated. The conquest of the river proves complete , 
as arriving Union troops find safety beneath its tall banks, while fleeing 
northern soldiers escape the horrors of the battlefield by blindly plunging 
into the sanctuary of the river. Furthermore, the narrative transformation 
of the river from a hostile environment into Union territory coincides 
with the Union troops gaining the advantage on the battlefield. Thus the 
conquest of the Tennessee as a Southern landscape becomes an integral 
part of Bierce's war narrative of the battle of Shiloh. 
Mankind has always narrated the environment through actions and 
representations, and the centrality of conquest as a theme in American 
history is not new. As such it is no surprise that the Tennessee River has 
been inscribed in a narrative of conquest formed by the ways in which the 
river has been used and represented. Although the Indian tribes of the 
Tennessee Valley initiated the narrative of conquest long before Euro-
pean settlers arrived, by using the river in ongoing wars against neigh-
boring tribes, it was not until the influx of white settlers into the area in 
the late 18th century that the narrative of conquest became as dominant a 
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part of the Tennessee River 's history as it is today. By looking at three 
versions of this narrative, John Donelson 's journey into Indian Territory 
to help found the settlement of N ashborough, the extensive use of the 
Tennessee for relocating the Indian tribes of the region, and the river's 
role in the battle of Shiloh , this essay has outlined the connection 
between the idea of conquest and one of the region's foremost natural 
resources; a connection that in the 1930s led to the definite defeat of the 
wild river when Roosevelt's Tennessee Valley Authority dammed it, 
turned it into a series of controllable and docile lakes, and harnessed its 
power for hydroelectric purposes. 
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